A survey and future vision of double auctions-based autonomous cloud service negotiations

Adnan, M.H. and Hassan, M.F. and Aziz, I.A. and Rashid, N.A. (2019) A survey and future vision of double auctions-based autonomous cloud service negotiations. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, 843 . pp. 488-498.

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Double auction-based mechanisms have gained considerable attention as autonomous cloud service negotiation because it has been proven to be economically efficient and possesses the ability to accommodate multiple buyers and sellers. The main objective of this paper was to outline the limitations of the practically tested double auction mechanisms in cloud service negotiations; and subsequently suggest future vision. Ten practically proven double auction-based mechanisms have been surveyed from the research database, whereby most of them were found to employ the double auction protocol and two variations of the double auction protocol, namely continuous double auction and combinatorial double auction. Comparisons on the types, objectives, parameters, and results between the selected mechanisms are presented in this paper. Moreover, it was identified that the surveyed double auction mechanisms were unable to address multi-attributes heterogeneous cloud services because it required a long execution time. Nevertheless, future vision managed to be suggested to solve these issues. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019.

Item Type:Article
Impact Factor:cited By 0; Conference of 3rd International Conference of Reliable Information and Communication Technology, IRICT 2018 ; Conference Date: 23 June 2018 Through 24 June 2018; Conference Code:218299
Uncontrolled Keywords:Soft computing; Surveys, Autonomous negotiation; Cloud service negotiations; Cloud services; Combinatorial double auctions; Continuous double auction; Double auction; Heterogeneous services; Multi-attributes, Distributed database systems
ID Code:22271
Deposited By: Ahmad Suhairi
Deposited On:28 Feb 2019 02:39
Last Modified:28 Feb 2019 02:39

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